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1FAIR USE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:  CORPORATE CONTROL OF 
COPYRIGHT IS STIFLING DOCUMENTARY MAKING AND THWARTING 
THE AIMS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
I.  Introduction:  Documentaries and the First Amendment  
 
From the New York Times, October 16, 2005: 
 
The moment seemed innocuous enough. 
Michael Vaccaro, a fourth grader, had just left P.S. 112 in Brooklyn and 
was headed home with his mother. Two filmmakers were in front of him, their 
camera capturing his every movement on video, when his mother's cell phone 
rang.  
 “It was such an indicator of today's culture," said Amy Sewell, a producer 
of Mad Hot Ballroom, the documentary that follows New York City children as 
they learn ballroom dancing and prepare for a citywide contest. “Michael's mom 
had just asked him how school was, her cell phone rings, she answers it, and the 
look on his face says, ‘I don't get to tell my mom about my day.’”  
 In addition, the ringtone was “Gonna Fly Now,” the theme from “Rocky,” 
and the neighborhood was Bensonhurst. “How perfect was that?” Ms. Sewell said.  
 Perfect, but a problem. Had the ring tone been a common telephone ring, 
the scene could have dropped into the final edit without a hitch, the moment 
providing a quick bit of emotional texture to the film. But EMI Music Publishing, 
which owns the rights to “Gonna Fly Now,” was asking the first-time producer for 
$10,000 to use those six seconds.  
 Ms. Sewell considered relying on fair use, the aspect of copyright law that 
allows the unlicensed use of material when the public benefit significantly 
outweighs the costs or losses to the copyright owner. But her lawyer advised 
against it. “I'm a real Norma Rae-type personality,” Ms. Sewell said, “but the 
lawyer said, ‘Honestly, for your first film, you don't have enough money to fight 
the music industry.’” After four months of negotiating – “I begged and begged,” 
Ms. Sewell said – she ended up paying EMI $2,500. 
 Total music clearance costs for Mad Hot Ballroom, which featured songs 
of Frank Sinatra and Peggy Lee, came to $170,000; total costs over all were about 
$500,000.1
A typical reader might ask, “Why would a music publisher ask a low-budget 
documentary to pay $10,000 for a brief, incidental ringtone sound?” 
 
1Nancy Ramsey, The Hidden Cost of Documentaries, N.Y. TIMES, October 16, 2005. 
 
2Another, more entertainment-industry savvy reader might say, “Hey, reality 
television and movies are filled with the sights and sounds of contemporary culture – if 
they have to pay license fees, why shouldn’t documentaries?” 
 Why should anyone have to pay to use a copyrighted ringtone, or a clip from a 
news program, TV show or movie? Aren’t these sights and sounds out there for us all to 
use?  What about the First Amendment and our free-speech rights? 
 The answer to these questions, of course, is that these materials constitute 
copyrighted intellectual property.  Copyright is as much a part of the U.S. Constitution as 
the First Amendment; legal scholars have traditionally viewed it as advancing First 
Amendment interests by providing an incentive for speech.  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
stated, “the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By 
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the 
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”2
The Copyright Act provides protection for both aural and visual works.3 Thus the 
copyright owner of a ringtone sound, like all copyright owners, has the right to decide 
who may use it and what price to charge. 
 What about the fair use doctrine, mentioned in the New York Times article? Fair 
use is one of the so-called “internal safety valves” that help reconcile copyright’s inherent 
 
2 Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (opinion by Justice O’Connor). 
 
3 Copyright law protects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression,” including pictorial and graphic works, audiovisual works and sound recordings. (17 
U.S.C., § 102(a)). 
 
3limitations with the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech.4 Fair use provides a 
narrow exception for some types of use.  It is called a safety valve because it purportedly 
guards against the chilling effect that would inhibit public speech if copyright owners 
were granted unlimited freedom to control the use of their creative works.  On paper, the 
doctrine seems to strike a fair balance – but as the news story indicates, reality does not 
match up to the principle.     
So why should documentary makers have different rights than other filmmakers?  
If a music publisher is going to charge for the use of its ringtone, why should it make any 
difference who’s using it?  And why would something this trivial implicate the First 
Amendment? 
This paper addresses these issues.  Its thesis is that documentaries constitute a 
crucial part of contemporary public debate, because in today’s highly consolidated mass 
media environment, they offer independent voices that the First Amendment was 
designed to protect.  Current intellectual property practices are chilling speech by forcing 
documentary filmmakers to tailor their films to accommodate new, strict licensing 
practices. 
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer has written, “The First Amendment must 
not be read in isolation, but as seeking to maintain a system of free expression designed 
to further a basic constitutional purpose:  creating and maintaining democratic decision-
making institutions.”5 Documentaries fit into this framework by offering speech that 
 
4 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STANFORD 
L.R. 1, 4 (Oct. 2001). 
 
5 STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 39 (2005). 
 
4contributes to public debate of significant issues, thereby helping to maintain our 
democratic decision-making institutions.   
 
II.  What makes a film a documentary? 
 
What is a documentary film?6 These days, the very question generates debate 
among its own practitioners.  Thirty-five years ago, Webster’s Dictionary defined the 
term simply as: “A motion picture that records news events or shows social 
conditions without fictionalization.”7
A more recent Webster’s definition reads:   “A work, such as a film or television 
program, presenting political, social, or historical subject matter in a factual and 
informative manner and often consisting of actual news films or interviews 
accompanied by narration.”8
The lengthier, more explicit definition signifies the field’s broad development in 
recent years.  The new phrase “in a factual and informative manner,” which replaces  
“without fictionalization,” points to problematic gray areas that have become a source 
of vociferous dispute among documentary-makers.  Journalism strives for objectivity, but 
a documentary work presented in a “factual and informative manner” may not be entirely 
factual.  It may contain re-enactments and fictional embellishments, and it also may 
convey an explicitly partisan point of view.  Morgan Spurlock, the filmmaker who 
 
6 “Nonfiction film” is another term commonly used to refer to the same type of work. 
 
7 WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 540 (Unabridged 2d ed. 1970) 
 
8 Eugene Hernandez, Is "Fahrenheit 9/11" a Documentary Film, or What is a Documentary 
Film?, http://www.indiewire.com/onthescene/onthescene_040702docs.html (definition cited by 
Super Size Me director Morgan Spurlock). 
 
5embarked on an extended McDonalds-only diet for “Super Size Me,” his commentary on 
how Americans’ fast-food habits affect our national health, has said:  
I believe that the very act of filmmaking, whether fictional or non-fictional, is 
filled with subjective decisions made on the part of the director for the betterment 
of his/her piece. Just because you are presenting facts and crafting an honest 
storyline does not completely remove the involvement of one's viewpoint from a 
project . . . we knowingly make decisions in the edit room that can affect the 
audience's reaction.9
When Michael Moore burst onto the cultural scene in the late 1980s with his 
provocative style of filmmaking (“Roger and Me,” “Bowling for Columbine,” and most 
recently, “Fahrenheit 9/11”), he raised the profile of the genre, even as he generated 
arguments over how much of a personal point of view should be inserted into a 
nonfiction film.  Moore unapologetically compares his work to that of a newspaper 
columnist:  “Documentaries by their very nature are supposed to have a point of view. . . .  
My form of doc is an op-ed piece. It presents my opinion that's based on fact.”10 
This dispute over definition comfortably fits into the long history of American 
public debate.  In fact, producer Liz Manne compares the current obsession over the 
definition of “documentary” to the lengthy Supreme Court discussion on what constitutes 
pornography: “It truly does come down to, ‘We know it when we see it.’”11 
Regardless of definition, documentaries constitute protected speech.  The 
Supreme Court has called motion pictures “a significant medium for the communication 
of ideas,”12 therefore “within the ambit of protection which the First Amendment . . . 
 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) 
 
6secures to any form of speech or the press.”13 While film technology may have been 
unknown to America’s Founders, the messages communicated by documentary films are 
part of the robust public dialogue that the First Amendment was designed to protect.  
Whether objective or subjective, aiming at illumination or persuasion, the messages they 
impart are all in keeping with our system’s “profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and 
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on 
government and public officials.”14 
III.       How insurance, licensing requirements and the threat of litigation affect      
 documentary filmmaking 
 
Documentaries need audiences if their speech is to be heard. But without a 
detailed record of rights clearance, by means of licensing or written authorization, they 
cannot get errors and omissions (“E & O”) insurance, without which a broadcaster or 
cablecaster will not show the work.15 Programmers, insurer and distributors are primarily 
concerned about the risk of lawsuits, however frivolous, rather than the story, message or 
information that the filmmaker is trying to convey.16 
E&O insurance was not always a necessity, but today programmers routinely 
require it, no matter what the film’s size or subject matter.  It is considered necessary 
these days because copyright owners now enforce their rights more aggressively than two 
 
13 Id. 
14 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (Opinion by Justice Brennan). 
 
15 Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF 
THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS, Center for Social 
Media 5 (November 2004). 
16Id. 
7decades ago,17 in large part because cable and DVD provide increased possibilities  for 
distribution and revenue.18 
E & O insurance applications ask whether the filmmaker has obtained licenses or 
consents from all copyright owners whose work appears in the finished film.  (See 
Appendix A for a sample E&O liability insurance application.)  If the filmmaker cannot 
truthfully answer “yes,” an insurance policy will not be issued unless the film’s legal 
counsel can persuade the insurer that the chance of litigation is slim.19 The result is that 
filmmakers are often compelled to edit their work to meet insurance requirements.  This 
harms the interests of not just the filmmaker, but also the public.   
Thus, another thesis of this paper is that the “clearance culture,” in which 
anything and everything that could possibly lead to a lawsuit must be cleared, is choking 
speech by hindering or preventing production of documentaries about important issues.  
For example, a documentary entitled Behind the Labels juxtaposed brief shots 
from a Gap commercial with hidden-camera images from a Saipan sweatshop typical of 
those that manufacture Gap clothing.20 The Oxygen Channel wanted to show the film, 
but the company’s attorneys insisted that the Gap footage be removed out of concern 
about liability.21 A narrator’s voiceover could have conveyed the same information, but 
not as memorably or effectively as the juxtaposed footage would have.   
 
17 Marjorie Heins and Tricia Beckles, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE?, Brennan Center for Justice at 
N.Y.U. School of Law 6 (December 2005) 
18 Aufderheide and Jaszi, supra, at 8. 
19 Producer Robert Stone (Guerilla: The Taking of Patty Hearst) says, “If you ever have a claim 
on E&O insurance, you might as well go into another line of work.  You can never file a claim or 
you get blacklisted – and can never be insured again.” (Aufderheide and Jaszi at 23.) 
 
20 Aufderheide and Jaszi, supra, at 25. 
21 Id. 
8Gap owns the advertising material that the filmmaker wanted to use, and a 
company that spends millions of dollars on ad campaigns doesn’t want consumers 
associating its products with the degrading conditions under which they are made.  No 
matter how unlikely the possibility that the clothing company would have filed suit 
against Oxygen, thereby exacerbating an embarrassing situation, Oxygen’s lawyers 
persuaded creative executives that this was a risk they could not afford to take.  An 
opportunity was thus lost to make a visual point that would have resonated with 
audiences, and could have helped lead to social change.  
Licensing problems generally fall into one of four categories:22 
1. Filmmakers don’t know where to go to obtain the rights. For example, when 
one filmmaker wanted to use brief segments from the musical works of Shostakovich, she 
was dismayed to discover that obtaining rights was much more difficult and time-
consuming than she had foreseen.23 “It was extremely complicated.  Different publishers 
publish Shostakovich.  I had to figure out which publisher has the right to license 
Shostakovich in North America.”24 
Most typically, the inability to track down rights owners arises with orphan 
works, i.e., copyrighted works whose owners are difficult or even impossible to locate.  
Under the 1976 Copyright Act, copyright originates the moment an original work of 
authorship is fixed in a tangible form.25 It need not be registered with the Copyright 
 
22 Id. at 11. 
23 Heins and Beckles, supra, at 19. 
 
24 Id. 
25 17 U.S.C., § 102(a). 
 
9Office or published with notice to obtain protection, nor is there any renewal requirement 
for registered works.   
When filling out an insurance application, a filmmaker whose film contains 
orphan works is stuck: how can you get a work cleared if you don’t know where to go?  
In the current environment, a filmmaker who wants to play by the rules will have to 
remove all images whose copyright owners can’t be located. 
2. The filmmaker knows who owns the rights, but can’t get a response. For 
example, Yoko Ono would not respond to the makers of Looking for Lennon, who were 
requesting the rights to John Lennon’s “Imagine.”  Ron Merk, the film’s producer, says, 
“It’s very frustrating, because the rights owners have no obligation to give you a 
license.”26 
3. The filmmaker gets a response, but the amount of money requested is 
exorbitant.  When the filmmaker who wanted to license Shostakovich’s work finally 
located the composer’s North American publisher, she was told the license price would 
be fifteen cents per DVD for each segment used, with a minimum of $5,000 for five 
years.27 This sum only covered North American rights (distribution is divided into 
geographic territories), and did not include public television rights or film festival 
rights.28 While that sum might be nominal for a large studio, it is often prohibitive for an 
independent producer. 
4. The filmmaker gets a response, only to learn that there are further hoops to 
jump through just to get the proposal read.  According to Looking for Lennon 
producer Merk, “There are so many lawyers and agents and managers, those levels of 
 
26 Aufderheide and Jaszi, supra, at 11. 
27 Heins and Beckles, supra, at 19. 
28 Id. 
10
buffers I would call them, between you and the creative people who create these other 
rights that you need to utilize.  Sometimes it’s just impossible to get to them.”29 
Licensing problems implicate the First Amendment because freedom of speech 
encompasses not just the freedom to voice diverse opinions, but also the freedom to hear 
them.  The Supreme Court has stated, “The self-expression of the communicator is not 
the only value encompassed by the First Amendment. One of its functions, often referred 
to as the right to hear or receive information, is to protect the interchange of ideas.  Any 
communication of ideas . . . furthers the purposes of the First Amendment.”30 Stringent 
licensing requirements thwart the communication of ideas by limiting the public’s ability 
to view creative works about social, political and cultural history.   
 For example, Strange Fruit, a documentary about lynching, depended on music 
that couldn’t be cleared for home video.  It is therefore unavailable on DVD.31 
Licensing requirements are preventing distribution of this work about a dark, often-
overlooked phenomenon in our history. 
 Similarly, Eyes on the Prize, the landmark fourteen-part series about the 
American civil-rights movement that originally aired on PBS stations during the 1980s, is 
no longer broadcast or sold new in the United States.32 The series utilized newsreels, 
clips from local television stations, still photos and music.  In preparation for airing, 
 
29 Aufderheide and Jaszi, supra, at 11. 
30 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 806-807 (1978)  
 
31 Aufderheide and Jaszi, supra, at 25. 
32 Katie Dean, Bleary Days for Eyes on the Prize, WIRED NEWS, December 22, 2004, 
http://www.wired.com/news. 
11
licensing rights had to be acquired for 272 still photographs, 492 minutes of scenes from 
more than 80 archives, and the songs associated with the civil-right movement.33 
When Eyes on the Prize was originally produced, the cost of licensing long-term 
rights was prohibitive, so the filmmakers opted for shorter  options.  Licensing rights 
began to expire in the mid-1990s.  As soon as the first group of rights expired, the film 
had to be pulled from distribution.34 The renewal process is proving time-consuming and 
expensive.35 Because of this, an entire generation of students is missing the opportunity 
to watch an engrossing account of an important era. 
 
IV.  Why should documentaries be treated differently from other films? 
 
Why should the First Amendment and fair use implicate documentaries more than 
other films?  The answer is: because documentaries are as important to our public debate 
as other films, but lack the heavy-duty economic muscle to assert their rights that 
mainstream studio films possess. 
Documentaries have long been the poor but well-meaning relative of the feature-
film industry, the sober, serious, “educational” side of the industry.  Yet they have also 
been some of our most effective agents for social change and enlightenment.  
 
33 Nancy Ramsey, The Hidden Cost of Documentaries, N.Y. Times,  October 16, 2005. 
 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
12
 
A.  Documentaries deal with significant contemporary issues 
Documentaries fill much the same the role that muckraking journalists served a 
century ago, acting as a social conscience to open the public’s eyes to social ills and the 
abuses of the powers that be:36 
• The Fog of War showed Robert McNamara as he recalled the unfolding of the 
Vietnam War, and the flawed assumptions that went into Pentagon planning. 
• Born into Brothels educated Americans about the lives of the children of Calcutta 
prostitutes. 
• Serengeti Shall Not Die, about the Serengeti National Park in Tanzania, raised 
worldwide awareness of the need for wildlife conservation and helped preserve 
the park for future generations.   
• Primary, which followed Democratic candidates John F. Kennedy and Hubert 
Humphrey through the 1960 Wisconsin primary, and The Control Room, about 
the 1992 Clinton campaign, showed us the inside workings of presidential 
campaigns.   
• Harlan County USA educated the rest of the country about the hard lives of 
striking Kentucky coalminers. 
• Enron:  The  Smartest Guys in the Room conveyed Enron executives’ scheming, 
arrogance and duplicity more forcefully than the book from which it derived, by 
letting us see for ourselves how smoothly Ken Lay, Andrew Fastow and others 
 
36 “Muckraker” definition: Wikipedia, http://www.en.wikipedia.org. 
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lied in front of the camera, even as Enron’s financial house of cards was 
collapsing.   
 
B. Most documentaries are not money-makers 
Regardless of subject matter, most independent37 documentaries are a labor of 
love.  No matter how small their budgets, few earn back their investment.  While the 
same financial facts of life may hold true for feature films, the difference is that features 
are financed by business entities.38 To use a political analogy, if features are financed 
like presidential campaigns, and attract contributors who believe they may earn a return 
on their investment, then documentaries, as often as not, are financed more like small-
town city council races – through personal appeals to relatives and friends, friends of 
friends, and through in-kind contributions.39 
Compared to the audiences for large-scale studio films, documentary audiences 
constitute a select few: members of the intellectual and cultural elite, and those with a 
particular interest in a specific subject matter.  Appendix B illustrates a comparison of the 
seventy-five top-grossing feature films and documentaries, in both list and chart form.  
The disparity is almost laughable:  While the top features all earned $180 million or 
more, only a very few of the top documentaries have grossed more than $5 million.  A 
 
37 To a certain extent, all documentaries can be called “independent,” because major film studios 
do not make documentaries (although they may distribute them).  Here, the term “independent” 
refers to nonfiction films other than those whose production is ordered and supervised by 
television companies such as the History Channel. 
 
38 –with a few notable exceptions, such as Robert Townsend’s 1987 Hollywood Shuffle, which, 
according to legend, the filmmaker was able to finish only by maxing out his personal credit 
cards. 
 
39 Interview with independent documentary producer Mindy Pomper Johnson (July 2005). 
14
studio feature film whose opening weekend garnered such dismal earnings would be 
yanked from the market. 
C. Documentaries are closer to journalism than to fiction 
 Notwithstanding the ongoing debate over the definition of “documentary,” all 
documentary-makers would agree that a bright line separates their genre from fiction 
films.  To use Michael Moore’s print-media metaphor, documentary films might be op-ed 
pieces, features or news stories, but they are not short stories or novels.  And they usually 
cover subjects that are unlikely to be covered by mainstream media. 
D. Documentaries contribute an independent voice to public debate  
 Documentaries serve as perhaps the last remaining vehicles for independent 
voices in mass media.  A recent compilation of media ownership shows that the vast 
majority of this country’s print, broadcast and cable companies fall under the umbrella of 
five publicly owned companies:  Time Warner, Disney, General Electric, News Corp, and 
Viacom.  (See Appendix C.)  This has a profound affect on the nature of what gets made. 
It’s not that television and film studios censor their creative executives:  In a 
society that prides itself on freedom of thought, only a very foolish corporate executive 
would venture to dictate which subjects are off-limits to his programmers.  But such 
meat-axe efforts are not necessary.  Creative executives understand that in order to hold 
their jobs, their programming must contribute to overall profitability by attracting the 
largest possible numbers in the desired demographic group.  Focus groups and marketing 
studies advance their efforts to appeal to that audience, whether it be males aged 18-35 or 
adults aged 25-49.  All too often, this leads to lowest-common-denominator 
programming. 
15
 In contrast, documentaries do not attract a broad audience.  However, they do 
draw the attention of those concerned with public policy, including the country’s 
influential opinion-shapers – the kind of people who watch the Sunday morning talk 
shows while the rest of the country is sleeping late or driving the kids to Sunday school.  
And therein lies their importance to our system of government.  Documentaries provide 
those who seek to shape public policy with vital information. 
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer’s book Active Liberty, which offers his 
vision of our constitutional system, emphasizes the First Amendment’s role in promoting 
informed participation in the electoral process:  
The people, and their representatives, should possess the tools, such as 
information and education, necessary to participate and govern effectively.40 . . .  
The First Amendment seeks to facilitate a conversation among ordinary citizens 
that will encourage their informed participation in the electoral process.41 . . . It 
seeks primarily to encourage the exchange of information and ideas necessary for 
citizens themselves to shape that ‘public opinion which is the final source of 
government in a democratic state.’42 
Documentarians’ independent voices contribute to that “exchange of information 
and ideas” necessary for citizens to “shape public opinion.” 
 
V.  The common roots of copyright and the First Amendment 
Like Isaac and Ishmael, forefathers of the Jews and Muslims, the Copyright Act 
and the First Amendment share a common ancestry, but have long since diverged into 
different, often conflicting paths.  Both were born in the early days of the United States, 
products of an educated British ruling class that engaged in animated discussion 
concerning the relatively new notions that rulers were not divinely appointed, that 
 
40 STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 16 (2005) 
41 Id. at 46. 
42 Id. at 47 (quoting Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y.1917)). 
 
16
humans had certain innate rights, and that governmental power derived from the people, 
rather than the other way around.   
The tension and conflicts inherent in the Copyright Act and the First Amendment 
are nothing new – they have been there from the start; yet the framers understood them to 
be able to coexist and serve the common function of helping to create and maintain an 
informed electorate.  However, in recent years the intellectual property rights generated 
by the 1976 Copyright Act and subsequent congressional amendments have overridden 
many First Amendment interests – with the blessing and approval of our federal courts. 
A.  The origins of the First Amendment 
The First Amendment  – “Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of 
speech or of the press” – was part of a Bill of Rights added to the new Constitution to win 
the approval of anti-Federalists who feared the new constitution lacked sufficient 
safeguards to prevent the new government from turning into a King George-like tyranny.  
The Bill of Rights is best understood as the enactment of a philosophy of 
individual natural rights that dominated American political thought in the Eighteenth 
Century.43 This philosophy was articulated in the Declaration of Independence’s 
pronouncement that individuals possess certain rights by virtue of their nature as rational 
human beings, not because the sovereign has granted them.  
John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, two widely read British political thinkers 
whose essays were published in the colonies as Cato’s Letters, identified three central 
values that the right of free speech is designed to advance: 
 
43 JAMES OSTROWSKI, A PANORAMIC HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, REMARKS 
TO THE WESTERN NEW YORK LIBRARY RESOURCES COUNCIL (March 22, 1995). 
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• First, freedom of speech allows people to criticize the government and make it 
more responsive to popular will.  Certainly, Michael Moore would argue that this 
is the aim of his documentaries. 
• Second, freedom of speech is necessary for the pursuit of truth in science and art.   
Such films as A Brief History of Time, about the life and work of cosmologist 
Stephen Hawkings; Artie Shaw: Time Is All You've Got, about the fabled band 
leader; and Maya Lin: A Strong Clear Vision, about the architect who designed 
the Vietnam War memorial, can be seen as furthering this goal. 
• Third, freedom of speech is essential for individual self-fulfillment and 
expression.44 Filmmaker Ross McElwee’s quirky, autobiographical 
documentaries (Backyard, Sherman's March, Six O'Clock News) are his own 
means of self-fulfillment and expression, employing a highly subjective narration 
to explain his on-camera experiences.45 Despite their highly personal nature, 
McElwee’s films have resonated with tens of thousands of movie-goers. 
Thanks to Cato’s Letters and other, like-minded political tracts that circulated 
during the 18th century, by the time the Constitution was drafted, America’s leading 
political thinkers took as a given the principles that freedom of speech and of the press 
were natural rights belonging to each citizen.  Before the Bill of Rights was written, 
Thomas Jefferson, away in France, chastised his protégé Madison for failing to include a 
bill of rights in the Constitution which should include, among others provisions, 
“freedom of the press.”46 
44 Id. 
45 PBS website, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/news/etc/bio.html. 
46 Id. 
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B.  The First Amendment’s contemporary interpretation 
 One hundred seventy-five years after the Constitution was ratified, Justice 
William Brennan, writing for the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
described the way in which the Court had amplified the Framers’ intentions regarding the 
First Amendment:47 
The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is 
secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions. The 
constitutional safeguard, we have said, “was fashioned to assure unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes 
desired by the people.” 48 . . .  The First Amendment, said Judge Learned Hand, 
“presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a 
multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To 
many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.” 49 
Thus, from its inception to current times, the First Amendment has been 
connected – not only in the mind of our highest court, but also in the public 
consciousness  –  with the belief that open, informed discussion of current events 
promotes stability and the overall health of the nation.  However, in an era of mass media 
convergence and consolidation, an “unfettered exchange of ideas” by a “multitude of 
tongues” becomes more difficult to achieve. 
 
C.  Copyright’s origins 
The Copyright and Patent Clause50 provides as to copyrights: “Congress shall 
have Power ... [t]o promote the Progress of Science ... by securing [to Authors] for 
limited Times ... the exclusive Right to their ... Writings.”  Like the rest of the 
 
47 376 U.S. 254, 269-270  (1964). 
48 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) 
49 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (D.C. S. D. N. Y. 1943). [Emphases 
added.] 
50 U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
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Constitution, this clause emerged out of habits of thinking that were both based on, and a 
reaction to, the British model. 
 The earliest British copyright laws were instruments of censorship.  In 1557,  
Queen Mary Tudor, sister of the better-known Elizabeth I, capped off a long struggle to 
censor printing presses by officially authorizing the Stationers’ Company, a guild of 
printers.51 Only members of the company could legally produce books, and the Crown 
had to approve any books they printed.52 The company was authorized to confiscate 
unsanctioned books.53 
Across the Atlantic, the colonies operated under the same law.54 Colonial 
governors were able to chill colonial presses by selectively issuing monopoly licenses.55 
When the British publishers’ monopoly protection came up for renewal in 1709, 
publishers lobbied to extend their control over publishing.56 To draw authors to their 
cause, they argued that the interests of both authors and the public were harmed by the 
lack of price stability in the marketplace.57 The combined efforts of authors and 
publishers resulted in the Statute of Anne, commonly considered the first copyright law.  
The statute established two levels of copyright:  New works were protected for fourteen 
years, renewable for fourteen.  Previously published books were granted an additional, 
nonrenewable twenty-one-year term. 
 
51 Siva Vaidhyanathan, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY at 37, New York University Press (2003). 
 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Vaidhyanathan at 38. 
55 Id. 
56 Vaidhyanathan at 39-40. 
 
57 Id. 
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 Although the author was mentioned as the statute’s beneficiary, the act was really 
another regulation of the practice of printing and selling books, and a recognition of the 
public’s interest in the process.58 The statute was designed to balance the interests of the 
book-printing industry with governmental concerns that monopolies were growing too 
powerful in England.59 In 1709, copyright was not about property, it was about control.60 
Today copyright remains as much about control as property:  Corporations routinely 
refuse to license uses that they perceive will reflect unfavorably on their “brand.” 61 
D.  The significance of the phrase “for limited times” 
The founders understood that the copyright clause could work both ways:  
Granting a monopoly serves as an incentive for production, but granting permanent 
ownership of a creative work makes it more difficult for others to adapt or try to build on 
that work.62 Special-interest groups have existed as long as there have been legislatures.  
This may be why the founders only gave Congress the power to grant copyright 
protection for “limited times.” 
The legal precedent for the crucial constitutional phrase “for limited times” lay in 
a series of English court rulings handed down shortly before the Declaration of 
 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 --or that they believe will ruffle influential feathers:  In August 2004, filmmaker Robert 
Greenwald released an updated version of his award-winning film, Uncovered: The Whole Truth 
About the Iraq War. For the DVD version, Greenwald added a clip of a Tim Russert interview 
with President George W. Bush on “Meet the Press,” NBC's Sunday morning talk show. The 
president was shown rather unconvincingly  defending his decision to go to war.  Greenwald 
asked NBC for permission to run the one-minute clip, offering to pay for the right, as he had done 
for every other clip that appears in the film. NBC said no. The network explained to his agent that 
the clip is "not very flattering to the president." Greenwald included it anyway.  (Lawrence 
Lessig, Copyrighting the President, WIRED MAGAZINE. (August 2004.) 
 
62 Kenneth A. Paulson, A constitutional clash: free speech, copyrights and Mickey Mouse, Oct. 
20, 2002, http://www.freedomforum.org. 
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Independence was written.  The rulings arose out of a court battle revolving around a 
fight over ownership rights to a now-forgotten poem called “The Seasons.”63 
A certain Millar owned the copyright to the poem.64 After the copyright expired, 
a printer named Taylor published it.65 Millar sued Taylor, and won. In Millar v. Taylor,66 
Lord Mansfield wrote an opinion reflecting the view that the poem was literary property 
subject to the same common-law property rights as other property, and that the author 
had permanently assigned these rights to Millar.67 
Five years later, Millar died and his estate sold the rights, which led to another 
lawsuit.68 In Donaldson v. Becket,69 the House of Lords stated unequivocally that 
copyright was not a perpetual natural right, but a state-granted privilege that should last 
for a limited time.70 The Lords clearly ruled that there had never been any such thing as 
copyright at common law.  The idea that authors had a natural property right to their 
work as a principle of common law lasted only five years.   
 The two cases, coming so shortly before the colonies declared their independence 
from the British Crown, influenced the drafting of the Constitution’s Copyright Clause.  
The drafters saw copyright neither as a natural right, nor as a common-law right on a par 
with other property rights, but as a temporary monopoly designed to encourage the 
 
63 Vaidhyanathan, supra at 42-43. 
 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 4 Burr. 2303 (1769). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 4 Burr. 2408 (1774). 
70 Id. 
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investment of time and money in works that might not otherwise find adequate reward in 
a completely free market.71 
James Madison argued for copyright in terms of “progress,” “learning,” and other 
such classic republican virtues as literacy and an informed citizenry.72 Copyright 
fulfilled its role for Madison because it looked forward as an encouragement, not 
backward as a reward.73 Madison believed that if the federal government were to operate 
as the nexus of competing interests, each interest would need to approach the public 
sphere with reliable information.74 Information could be deemed reliable only if it were 
subject to public debate.  Ideas could be judged beneficial only if they had stood the tests 
of discourse and experience.  In this way, the drafters’ underlying goals for copyright and 
the First Amendment merged. 
 
VI.   Copyright and the evolution of the idea/expression dichotomy 
 One of the maxims of copyright law, now codified in section 102(b) of the 
Copyright Act75, is that copyright protection does not extend to an idea, but only to the 
expression of that idea.  The idea/expression dichotomy, like the First Amendment and 
the notion of fair use, was created in a cultural environment where the terms “mass 
media” and “print media” were synonymous.   
 
71Vaidhyanathan, supra at 8. 
 
72 Vaidhyanathan, supra at 22. 
 
73Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Section 102(b) states: “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
extend to any idea, . . . concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is 
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” 
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 Judge Learned Hand’s opinions played a large role in shaping contemporary legal 
thinking about where to draw the line between idea and expression, such that 
appropriation on one side is infringement, but on the other is not.  Judge Hand presided 
over the appeals court responsible for cases from New York City during the formative 
years of American mass culture, when that city was the center of the motion picture, 
publishing, music composition and theater industries.76 
Hand played a part in most of the major copyright decisions of the 1920s and 
1930s.  In the wake of a number of copyright infringement lawsuits alleging that one 
theatrical play or motion picture had stolen another’s plot, he wrote a series of opinions 
delineating the idea/expression dichotomy.77 Since then, other federal judges have 
elaborated on his opinions.   
Today, in determining whether a defendant has appropriated the plaintiff’s 
expression, or merely the idea, the factfinder investigates whether there are substantial 
similarities in sequences of scenes, characters, and storyline.  More specifically, the 
process involves examining the following aspects of the works78:
(1)  Substantial similarity in expression of the idea – whether the average 
layperson would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the 
work; 
 
76 Vaidhyanathan, supra, at 106. 
 
77 Judge Hand’s copyright infringement opinions include Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875 (1910), 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (1930), and Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures 
Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (1936). 
 
78 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d 119; Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81
F.2d 49, supra; Alfred Bell v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (1951), Sid & Marty Krofft v 
McDonald’s, 562 F.2d 1157 (1977). 
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(2)  Similarity is not limited to, on the one extreme examining the text literally, or 
on the other, to a series of abstract ideas.  A court that limited the inquiry to the 
literal examination of the text would never find plagiarism; a person could make 
enough changes to escape prosecution. 
(3)  Characters and plot –  the sequence of incidents.  It is difficult to find 
infringement when only the characters are similar. 
(4)  Scenes à faire – characters, settings or events which necessarily follow from a 
certain theme or plot situation, or which have been depicted so often as to become 
part of the popular idiom. 
(5)  The concept and feel of both works. 
While this process may (and often does) lead to disagreements, it sets forth a 
straightforward framework for analysis of plays, movies, and books.  But this framework 
has no utility in terms of the issues that plague documentary makers who produce 
nonfiction works in a real-life setting, where the images and sounds of contemporary 
mass culture are pervasive. 
 Practically speaking, in today’s clearance culture, a documentary film that seeks 
to capture reality often cannot afford to do so.  Because of rights problems, filmmakers 
sometimes need to falsify or change reality79 –  even when the film is cinema verité, 
aimed at showing the mundane truth of peoples’ everyday lives and the social context in 
which they live.80 One filmmaker says that when entering a new location, to avoid 
clearance problems, “The first thing you do, in a bizarre way, is that you quiet things.  
 
79 Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF 
THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS, Center for Social 
Media at American University 17 (November 2004). 
 
80 Robert McConnell, Realism, http://www.Parlez-vous.com (1997) 
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You might not necessarily want to turn the music off, because it might work for the 
scene.  However, from a budget standpoint you might find yourself turning it off.”81 
VII.   The origins of fair use 
 Understanding why fair use, that purported constitutional safety valve, works so 
poorly in practice requires a look at its origins.  The roots of what we now know as “fair 
use” are firmly planted in the early English common law, where the defense was known 
as “abridgement,” based on an author offering a paraphrase or summation of another 
author’s work.82 
Conceptually, fair use occupies the area of intellectual property law where a 
successful action for copyright infringement would interfere with the aims of the First 
Amendment.  One federal court has written, “From the earliest days of the doctrine, 
courts have recognized that when a second author uses another’s protected expression in 
a creative and inventive way, the result may be the advancement of learning rather than 
the exploitation of the first writer.”83 
Fair use as we know it was first introduced to American law with Justice Story’s 
opinion in Folsom v. Marsh:84 
In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and 
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and 
the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or 
supersede the objects, of the original work. 
 
81 Aufderheide and Jaszi, supra, at 17. 
82 Maxton-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1259 (1986) 
 
83 Id. 
84 9 F.Cas 342, 341 (Mass.) (1841) 
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Justice Story distinguished works that used passages “for the purposes of fair and 
reasonable criticism” from those that took “the most important parts of the work, with a 
view, not to criticize, but to supersede the use of the original work.”85 The first example 
would be considered lawful, the second would be considered “piracy.”86 Lawful use 
required “real, substantial condensation of the materials, and intellectual labor and 
judgment bestowed thereon; and not merely the facile use of the scissors; or extracts of 
the essential parts, constituting the chief value of the original work.” 87 
Justice Story’s opinion became the basis for all judicial fair-use analysis, and was 
eventually codified as Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act.  When Congress enacted 
the legislation, the reports accompanying it explicitly stated that the new statute was 
designed to “restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or 
enlarge it in any way.”88 
Unfortunately, fair use only works as a shield, not a sword.  It serves as a defense 
after an action has been filed, so before it can be utilized, a person must have already 
been sued.  The threat of costly litigation (in Los Angeles County, the filing fee to 
respond to a lawsuit costs $300 alone) is enough to chill speech. 
VIII.  The limits of the idea/expression dichotomy:  What happens when the  
 medium is the message? 
 
Licensing issues implicate the First Amendment:  If the constitutional right to free 
expression doesn’t keep pace with evolving means of expression, the First Amendment 
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will be eviscerated.  We now live in a multi-media environment, where even billboards 
feature movie screens.89 When educators describe the youth of today, they invariably use 
phrases like ‘“digital natives” and “visual learners.”90 Thus, while the First Amendment 
was born and evolved with a view toward the print medium,91 high-tech media may be 
more important today in terms of an enlightened public sphere. 
Thirty-five years ago, long before the dawning of the digital age, Melville B. 
Nimmer gave some recognition to this problem in a law review article.92 Discussing the 
distinction between fair use and the First Amendment, Nimmer noted: 
The scope and extent of fair use falls within the discretion of Congress. The 
limitations of the first amendment are imposed upon Congress itself. Fair use, 
when properly applied, is limited to copying by others which does not materially 
impair the marketability of the work which is copied.  The first amendment 
privilege, when appropriate, may be invoked despite the fact that the 
marketability of the copied work is thereby impaired.93 (Emphasis added.)  
 
Nimmer discussed this principle in relation to Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis  
Associates,94 a then-recent case involving the unauthorized copying of frames from the 
Zapruder film of President Kennedy’s assassination.  Nimmer took issue with the 
opinion’s reasoning, but not the court’s holding, which was that the public interest in 
 
89 This phenomenon currently appears to be limited to the Sunset Strip, but undoubtedly it will 
spread. 
90 Apple Education Resources, PROFILES IN SUCCESS: TEXAS SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF - 
iBOOK LAPTOPS SUPPORT VISUAL LEARNERS, http://www.apple.com/education/profiles/ 
texas/. 
 
91 “Congress shall make no laws abridging the freedom of the press . . .” (Emphasis added.)   
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having the fullest information available on the murder of President Kennedy outweighed 
the copyright owner’s interest.95 
The defendant had published a book containing frames of the famous film, the 
copyright to which was owned by the plaintiff.  Nimmer wrote that the court, in finding 
for the defendant, “purported to rely upon fair use rather than the first amendment.  He 
therefore found it necessary to take the position that the defendant’s activities in 
publishing a book, containing copied frames of the Zapruder film, did not work any 
injury to the plaintiff’s market for the same film.”  Rejecting that line of reasoning, 
Nimmer argued, “The result in the Bernard Geis case can be defended, if at all, not on the 
ground of fair use, but rather because of the . . . free speech elements inherent in the 
film.”96 
These “free speech elements” consist of “certain areas of creativity where the 
‘idea’ of a work contributes almost nothing to the democratic dialogue, and it is only its 
expression which is meaningful.”97 According to Nimmer, such areas include certain 
classic works of art – the Mona Lisa, Michelangelo’s Moses – as well as certain types of 
culturally or historically significant photographs.  As a case in point, Nimmer cited the 
photographs of the My Lai massacre. With the Vietnam War at its height in 1970 (the 
 
95 Id. at 146.  The paradigmatic story concerning fair use in the real world – perhaps the best 
example that fair use does not really exist – is that two decades after Bernard Geis Associates,
documentary producer Geraldine Wurzburg was compelled to pay a license fee for the Zapruder 
footage, in spite of the fact that a first-generation print had been donated by the family, and is 
now housed in a public museum. (Aufderheide and Jaszi, supra, at 25.) 
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publication date of the article), that incident, in which U.S. military forces killed dozens 
of unarmed women and children, was much in the news: 
Here is an instance where the visual impact of a graphic work made a unique 
contribution to an enlightened democratic dialogue. . . The photographic 
expression, not merely the idea, became essential if the public was to fully 
understand what occurred in that tragic episode.  It would be intolerable if the 
public’s comprehension of the full meaning of My Lai could be censored by the 
copyright owner of the photographs.  Here I cannot but conclude that the  speech 
interest outweighs the copyright interest.98 
Nimmer noted that the Bernard Geis opinion, while purportedly using fair use 
rationale to hold for the defendant, had justified the defendant’s right to copy frames of 
the film on the ground of the “public interest in having the fullest information available 
on the murder of President Kennedy.”  While the public could have learned the facts of 
both incidents without recourse to the photographs, Nimmer pointed out that “without 
access to the photographs, all facts and interests relevant to the problem would not be 
fully and fairly presented.99 In the case of My Lai, a denial that in fact any deaths had 
occurred would have been devastatingly refuted by the photographs in a way that the 
verbal reports of deaths simply could not do. . . . The photographs themselves – the 
‘expression of the idea’ – made all the difference.”100 
Nimmer recognized that copyright holders would undoubtedly rebut this 
suggestion with the argument that treating such photographs as outside the scope of 
copyright protection would deprive them of income.  He proposed the application of a 
compulsory license approach, patterned not on the compulsory license relating to musical 
compositions, but rather one equivalent to “a reasonable royalty.”101 
98 Id. at 1197-1198. 
99 Id.  at 1198 (citing Meilejohn). 
100 Id..
101 Id. at 1199. 
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IX.    Corporate control over copyright 
A.  The extension of duration  
From this country’s earliest days up until the 20th century, the copyright term 
remained limited two fourteen-year terms.  If a work was not re-registered at the end of 
the first term, it fell into the public domain.  As a practical matter, most works derived all 
their potential profitability long before the first term ended, and the majority fell into the 
public domain after fourteen years, becoming available for all to use.102 
In 1909 Congress rewrote the copyright laws, extending the copyright term from 
two fourteen-year terms to two twenty-eight year terms.  More significantly, the new law 
also allowed for corporate authorship.103 Up until this point, copyright had originated 
with the author, which meant that compilations such as newspapers and magazines were 
not eligible for copyright protection.  The new corporate authorship category was a 
product of extensive publisher lobbying.  Along with corporate authorship came the 
work-made-for-hire doctrine, which would eventually become the dominant factor in 
American copyright.104 Today, leaving aside books, most significant works are 
copyrighted in the name of corporations.105 
USA Today editor Kenneth A. Paulson, formerly with The First Amendment 
Center, has written:  
The original copyright law was designed to protect creators and their 
families.  Over time, large corporations and media interests and theme parks 
became the wealthiest and most powerful copyright holders.  Corporations like 
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Disney build much of their empires by relying on public domain material, using 
Pinocchio, Snow White, Cinderella and many others free of charge.  They then 
put their own creative stamp on these works and copyright them for their own 
protection.106 
Having virtually swallowed up many public domain works for their own 
aggrandizement – one practical consequence of which is that the public now associates 
the Grimm Brothers’ characters with Disney’s copyrighted versions – the large 
entertainment corporations also have gained the benefit of a prolonged period of 
protection for their copyrighted works.  Under the 1976 Act, works made for hire receive 
protection for 120 years from the date of creation, or 95 years from the date of 
publication.   
The lengthier ownership period benefits companies that own profitable works, but 
it also impedes speech by limiting works’ creative uses to those approved by the 
corporate copyright owner.  A documentary that uses copyrighted works to criticize the 
corporation that owns the material will find it difficult to procure E&O insurance.  While 
the fair use doctrine purportedly allows the use of copyrighted works for purposes of 
criticism, E&O insurance policies require permission for every snippet of film, 
photograph, music or text that is used, and the application forms make no mention of fair 
use.107 Donald Reiff, a leading E&O insurance broker, has said that a good attorney can 
occasionally negotiate riders to the policy for fair use; but if a film contains controversial 
material – “if it’s really blasting something – like investigative reporting – then that could 
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be a problem . . . they may want to stop you from doing it.  Which is the most common 
form of censorship.”108 
Moreover, in the vast majority of situations, where a work no longer has any 
earning potential, the extended duration of copyright inhibits speech to no one’s 
advantage, by withholding works from the marketplace of ideas that will not be utilized. 
B.  Technology’s end run around the copyright clause 
Jack Valenti, former longtime Washington, D.C. lobbyist for the studios, 
famously argued that the constitutional requirement of “limited times” would be satisfied 
if the term were extended to “forever minus a day.”  While the Constitution theoretically 
prevents corporations from deriving perpetual royalties from their works, technology has 
succeeded in achieving an end-run around the Constitution’s “limited times” mandate.  
Thanks to digital encryption, corporate copyrights now control many works that are 
actually in the public domain, by placing them on DVDs containing anti-copying 
technology.  “Paracopyright” is the term used to describe technology that prevents public 
domain works from being copied.   
Now that videos are going the way of the tape-deck player, DVDs whose content 
requires licensing are fast becoming the only means of accessing many public domain 
works. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act109 criminalizes any attempt to circumvent 
the technology for reproduction purposes or otherwise.  Thus, even works in the public 
domain must now be licensed before they can be used by documentary makers. 
C. Intellectual property and congressional largesse 
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 Fair use is close to the heart of free expression.  If copyright holders can control – 
and effectively ban – every quotation or other use of their work, they can exercise a 
powerful form of censorship.110 Yet for all practical purposes, this is the state of affairs 
today.  The copyright law-First Amendment see-saw has tilted sharply toward copyrights 
holders, to the disadvantage of the public and the polity. 
As history indicates, the concept of copyright as a property right is not new.111 
However, throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, property talk was balanced and 
neutralized by policy talk – a discussion of what was best for society.112 That is no 
longer the case.  
One important reason for this is the way copyright policy is now crafted.  For 
more than a decade, business lobbyists haven’t merely influenced legislation – they have 
literally drafted it.113 William F. Patry, former legal counsel for the U.S. House of 
Representatives Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration, has 
written that copyright interest groups “hold fundraisers for members of Congress, write 
campaign songs, invite members of Congress and their staff to private movie screenings 
or sold-out concerts, and draft legislation they expect Congress to pass without any 
changes.”114 
Patry has documented how in 1993, Subcommittee Chair Representative  William 
Hughes introduced a copyright reform act concerning digital performance rights that 
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displeased the music industry.115 Industry lobbyists gave him their own version to 
replace it, much of which he rejected on policy grounds.116 Two years later, at a Senate 
Judiciary Hearing on new digital performance rights legislation, witness after witness 
repeated “mantra-like” the position that Congress should enact the draft they had given 
Rep. Hughes.117 “The message at the hearing was, ‘we drafted it, the best thing for you 
to do is enact it down to the commas.’ The committee did just that.”118 
Politicians have always relied on the influence and support of interest groups, but  
Congress’ relinquishment of its public responsibility for copyright policy to monolithic 
media giants works especially great harm to the public welfare.  Copyright is inextricably 
related to intellectual innovation.  The damage caused by lawmakers’ opting to allow 
private interests to divvy up the spoils among themselves,119 with no consideration for the 
public welfare, is more subtle and nefarious with copyright than in other public policy 
areas.  In most areas, political mistakes eventually come to light when some disaster 
strikes –  whether it be in the form of riots, flooding or terrorism.  In contrast, it is 
difficult to quantify the harm caused when creative works are not made that might have 
been, were the vocabulary used to create audiovisual works more easily available. 
X.   Free Speech/Free Market: What Happens When The Marketplace Of Ideas 
Is Privately Owned? 
 
The pen is, if not always mightier, often more subtly effective than the sword.   
Language – that is, choice of terminology  –  is powerful.  In Gravity's Rainbow, Thomas 
Pynchon wrote, “If they can get you asking the wrong questions, they don't have to worry 
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about answers.”  The large media corporations have managed to tilt the playing field 
without the players even realizing it by taking a debate that is really about speech and 
converting it a debate about property rights.
Anyone who goes to movies or watches television has seen entertainment 
industry-sponsored anti-piracy ads that equate downloading and other unauthorized use 
of intellectual property with shoplifting.  Watching these ads, one would never guess that 
copyright is a limited right.   
American courts uphold mass media companies’ stranglehold over copyright 
because they accept the authoritative word of Nimmer on Copyright,120 the bible of 
copyright interpretation, which states: 
It is usually said that an essential element of property is the legal right to exclude 
others from enjoying it, and that such a right may be enforced as against any 
member of the public. . . .  A copyright owner possesses a property interest in this 
absolute sense.  He may exclude all persons from copying his work, not merely 
those with whom he has contracted or those standing in a fiduciary relationship.121 
Nimmer’s categorical statement that copyright owners have a legal right to 
exclude all others from enjoying their property omits any consideration of public policy 
interests.  Yet there have been occasions on which our courts held that public policy 
interests and the First Amendment would trump the rights of private property owners. 
A.   Public policy interests may trump private property rights 
Courts have ruled that where a private property owner’s interests run contrary to 
public policy interests, the law will intervene.  Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co.122 dealt 
 
120 While the treatise’s author, David Nimmer, has publicly expressed reservations about recent 
trends in congressional copyright policy (David Nimmer, Southwestern Law School 2004 
Melville B. Nimmer copyright speech.), Nimmer on Copyright stands as the authority for judicial 
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121 Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 16.02 (2005). 
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with a testator’s directive that her residential property should be torn down, which her 
heirs contested.  In deciding the matter, the court approvingly cited a Scottish case in 
which a testator had ordered construction of a private amphitheater that would contain 
statues erected to honor her family.  The amphitheater was to be so private that no one at 
all would be allowed in:123 
Balustrades were to be erected so that [no one] would have access inside.  Special 
provision was made for keeping out the public and the ground enclosed was 
expressly declared to be a private enclosure.  There were no living descendants of 
any member of the family who might, if so permitted, take pleasure in 
contemplating the proposed statues.124 
The Scottish court struck down these provisions, stating that “without being 
illegal . . . the principle of public policy will prevent such post-mortem expenditure.”125 
Following the Scottish court, the Eyerman court said, “A well-ordered society cannot 
tolerate the waste and destruction of resources when such acts directly affect important 
interests of other members of that society.” 
Likewise, it runs counter to public policy to allow media copyright owners to 
withhold certain works from public use, when such acts directly harm important interests 
of society.  For example, news broadcasters that own copyrighted archives of past news 
stories can make it difficult, or prohibitively expensive, to license their stories, even when 
broadcast news is the primary audiovisual record of a historical event.126 As copyright 
owners, they have the absolute right to do whatever they want with the materials, 
including destroy them.  One frustrated documentary maker has said, “History is being 
 
123 M’Caig’s Trustees v. Kirk-Session of the United Free Church of Lismore, 1915 Sess. Cas. 426 
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wiped away, and we don’t have reasonable access to the real moving visual materials to 
properly construct films . . . even though, through the airwave license, networks are sort 
of grantees of the citizens of the U.S.”127 This filmmaker suggests mandating that 
television news gatherers make their material available to the public after five years. 
B.   The First Amendment may trump private property rights 
The U.S. Supreme Court has considered the public’s First Amendment rights vis-
à-vis private property rights.  Marsh v. Alabama128 involved a company-owned town 
whose corporate owner refused to allow distribution of religious literature on sidewalks 
outside of stores. The legal basis for the policy was the state anti-trespassing law, which 
criminalized entering or remaining on another’s property after being warned not to do so. 
In deciding the issue of whether all residents and visitors might be denied 
constitutional rights simply because a single company held legal title to the town 
property, the Court stated: 
We do not agree that the corporation’s property interests settle the 
question. . .  Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion.  The more an 
owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, 
the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional 
rights of those who use it.129 
A world where public places are inundated with corporate logos and copyrighted 
images is comparable to the privately-owned company town in Marsh. Just as the 
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment limited the rights of the town’s corporate 
owner to control the use of its property, so should a corporate copyright holder’s right to 
control the use of its property be limited by the First Amendment.  Thus, a documentary-
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maker whose camera captures music, logos, and other copyrighted cultural artifacts in a 
public place should have a First Amendment right to utilize those artifacts in his film 
without facing a civil lawsuit.   
Regarding the Marsh townspeople’s First Amendment rights, the court stated: 
When we balance the Constitutional rights of property owners against those of the 
people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, we remain mindful of the fact that 
the latter occupy a preferred position.  The right to exercise the liberties 
safeguarded by the First Amendment lies at the foundation of free government by 
free men, and we must in all cases weigh the circumstances and appraise the 
reasons in support of the regulation of those rights.130 
Likewise, courts need to begin weighing the circumstances and appraising the 
reasons behind licensing practices that make no room for the liberties safeguarded by the 
First Amendment. 
XI. Contemporary fair use in action: death of a documentary 
 
Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act reads:  
 
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is 
a fair use the factors to be considered shall include: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;  
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;  
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and  
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.  
 
In 2003, the Ninth Circuit used these factors to determine that The Definitive 
Elvis, an unauthorized video documentary about Elvis Presley’s life, was not entitled to 
utilize unlicensed video clips, photographs, and music under the fair use doctrine.131 The 
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holding proved the death knell for a creative effort that must have involved considerable 
time and energy. 
The Definitive Elvis contained sixteen one-hour episodes on Presley, each with its 
own theme.132 A great deal of it was original material, including interviews with more 
than 200 people regarding virtually all aspects of Presley’s life.133 However, five to ten 
percent consisted of copyrighted materials, including Presley’s appearances on television 
shows.134 
The documentary production company had not intended to be a freeloader:  It had 
requested a license to use the materials, but was refused because Presley Enterprises 
planned to release its own anthology in the near future.135 
Soon after the first Definitive Elvis videocassettes reached stores, Presley 
Enterprises sued for copyright infringement, at the same time seeking a preliminary 
injunction forbidding further distribution.136 The district court granted the injunction, and 
the defendant immediately appealed to the Ninth Circuit.137 
After hearing arguments, a three-judge panel voted 2-1 to uphold the lower court 
ruling.  Judge Noonan, who found himself on the losing side, filed an outraged dissent.  A 
few months later, after apparently giving the matter further thought, he filed an amended 
dissent that included several new paragraphs concerning the ruling’s First Amendment 
implications.138 
132 Id. at 625. 
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A. The first fair use factor: the purpose and character of the use 
 
The majority opinion began by describing the abuse-of-discretion standard of 
review it was required to follow:  “A district court abuses its discretion if it bases its 
decision on an erroneous legal standard or clearly erroneous legal findings.”139 
After laying out the parties’ respective positions, the court prefaced its discussion 
by citing a guiding principle laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court, that fair-use analysis 
“should not be simplified with bright-line rules, but instead requires a case-by-case 
analysis.”140 This type of analysis, which at first glance may seem to assure a better 
brand of justice, in practice does not lend itself to predictable rules that might serve as 
useful guides for filmmakers. 
Looking at the first of the four factors, the purpose and character of the use, the 
court noted that “the fact that a new use is commercial as opposed to non-profit weighs 
against a finding of fair use.  And the degree to which the new user exploits the copyright 
for commercial gain – as opposed to incidental use as part of a commercial enterprise – 
affects the weight we afford commercial nature as a factor.”141 Here, the documentary 
had clearly been intended for commercial gain. 
However, the court then stated that the “transformative” nature of the new work 
would be more important than any commercial aspect:  “The more transformative a new 
work, the less significant other inquiries, such as commercialism, become.”142 The court 
pointed to two prior cases involving documentary biographies, where the use of film clips 
was determined to be sufficiently transformative as to weigh in favor of fair use.  
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In Monster Communications, Inc. v. Turner Broadcasting,143 the issue concerned 
the defendant’s use of less than two minutes of video footage of Muhammad Ali in a 
biography of the boxer.  The court found that the biography, while commercial, 
constituted “a combination of comment, criticism, scholarship and research concerning a 
figure of legitimate public concern,”144 thus the purpose and character weighed in favor 
of fair use.145 
In Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks,146 the court found the A & E 
Channel’s use of a copyrighted movie trailer clip for a biography of Peter Graves to be 
transformative, thus leading to a finding of fair use, because the use “was not shown to 
recreate the creative expression reposing in plaintiff’s film.”147 
In contrast, the court found that use of the Presley film clips here was not 
consistently transformative.148 The filmmaker was “not advertising a scholarly critique 
or historical analysis,”149 but instead sought “to profit at least in part from the inherent 
entertainment value of Elvis’ appearances.”150 
The court admitted that the defendant had used many of the Presley television 
clips in a transformative way, “because the clips play for only a few seconds and are used 
for reference purposes while a narrator talks over them or interviewees explain their 
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context in Elvis’ career.”151 After stating that it “would be impossible to produce a 
biography of Elvis without showing some of his most famous television appearances for 
reference purposes,”152 the court said: “But some of the clips are played without much 
interruption, if any.  The purpose of showing these clips likely goes beyond merely 
making a reference for a biography, but instead serves the same intrinsic entertainment 
value that is protected by Plaintiffs’ copyrights.”153 
Admitting that the first factor was “a close issue,”154 the court ultimately decided 
that the film used more clips than were actually necessary to tell the story of Elvis’s life, 
determining that their real purpose was simply “for entertainment purposes that Plaintiffs 
rightly own,”155 leading to a finding that the district court had not abused its discretion in 
deciding that the first factor weighed against fair use. 
B.   The second fair use factor:  the nature of the copyrighted work 
Turning to the second fair-use factor, the nature of the works, the court stated: 
The law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than 
works of fiction or fantasy . . . .For example, works such as original songs, motion 
pictures, and photographs taken for aesthetic purposes, are creative in nature and 
thus fit squarely within the core of copyright protection.  But works such as news 
broadcasts and news video footage are more conducive to fair use.156 
However, as to the still photographs used in the documentary, the court said that 
they did not “depict newsworthy events, nor are the pictures inherently newsworthy, but 
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instead comprise the photographer’s artistic product.157 Moreover, it is undisputed that 
original musical compositions are inherently creative.”158 For this reason, the court stated 
that it “could not say” that the district court had abused its discretion in reaching the 
conclusion that  the second factor weighed in Plaintiff’s favor.159 
C.   The third fair use factor: the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used  
 
Regarding the third factor, the amount and substantiality used in relation to the 
work as a whole, the court noted the importance of evaluating the qualitative nature of the 
work used – “we look to see whether ‘the heart’ of the copyrighted work is taken – in 
other words, whether the portion taken is the ‘most likely to be newsworthy and 
important in licensing serialization.’”160 The court stated that the use of so many clips, 
even though relatively short, lasting a few seconds, were “in many instances the heart of 
the work.”161 Again, the court stated that it could not say that the district court had 
abused its discretion in reaching the conclusion that  the third factor weighed in 
Plaintiff’s favor.162 
D.    The fourth fair use factor: the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for the copyrighted work 
 
As for the fourth factor  – “undoubtedly the single most important of all”163 – the 
effect the use would have “on the potential market for and value of the copyrighted 
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works”164 – the court noted that “the more transformative the new work, the less likely 
the new work’s use of copyrighted materials will affect the market for the materials;”165 
but said that “if the purpose of the new work is commercial in nature, the likelihood of 
market harm may be presumed.”166 
Here, the court ruled that because the use was undisputedly commercial in nature, 
because the defendant had “expressly advertised that The Definitive Elvis contains the 
television appearances for which Plaintiffs normally charge a licensing fee,”167 and 
because Defendant’s use of the television appearances “was, in some instances, not 
transformative, and therefore likely to affect the market because they serve the same 
purpose as Plaintiff’s original works,” “we cannot say that the district court abused its 
discretion”168 in finding that this factor weighed in favor of the Plaintiff. 
The court closed by repeating a phrase it had stated throughout the analysis: “We 
emphasize that our holding today is not intended to express how we would rule were we 
examining the case ab initio as district judges.  Instead, we confine our review to whether 
the district court abused its discretion . . .”169 
E. Judge Noonan’s dissent 
Judge Noonan based his interpretation of how the case ought to have been 
decided on the issue of transformativeness.  His dissent stated that the district court had 
“misstated critical facts and misstated the governing law.”170 
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In terms of the critical facts, Judge Noonan believed that the court should not 
have deferred to the trial court’s blanket adoption of the Plaintiff’s Statement of Fact, 
which repeatedly stated, “Defendants did not add anything new or transformative to the 
copyrighted works” – thus conveniently ignoring the addition of the voice-over 
narrative.171 Judge Noonan countered, “Not only are the ignored voice-overs new.  They 
are transformative.  They turn the original Presley shows into part of a substantial 
biography. . . . Rather than regurgitation, Passport provides independent analysis of the 
appearance and frames it in the context of Elvis’s life and career.”172 Likewise, Judge 
Noonan noted that the copyrighted photos that had been used were “not presented for 
their own sake,”173 but were “intelligently incorporated into the larger, 16-hour 
biography.”174 
Judge Noonan then proceeded to lecture his colleagues that “a judge may not 
abdicate his responsibility by continuing to omit key facts that have been omitted by the 
party on whose work the judge is relying”175 –  that is, the existence of the voice-overs.  
He stated: 
The resolution of this case and the grant of the preliminary injunction 
affect the public interest.  The King is dead but his legacy remains very much 
alive.  . . .  USA Today . . . described the documentary as “the most 
comprehensive overview yet of the King’s personal and professional life.”176 
The judge went on to say that the public interest in viewing the Elvis biography 
outweighed any harm the Plaintiff might suffer.177 He reminded his colleagues that the 
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Ninth Circuit had previously held, in Abend v. MCA,178 that where “an injunction could 
cause public injury by denying the public the opportunity to view a classic film, 
Hitchcock’s Rear Window, monetary damages would adequately compensate the plaintiff 
for any infringement. . . . There is little doubt that a television biography of Muhammed 
[sic] Ali is a subject of public interest.  There is equally little doubt of the public interest 
in Elvis.”179 
According to the dissent, in determining whether an injunction was proper, the 
district court ought to have included an analysis of the public interest, either as part of a 
balancing of hardships or as a separate inquiry:180 
In a case of this kind involving the biography of a man with an immense 
following, it is necessary for a court to keep in mind that injunctions are a device 
of equity and are to be used equitably, and that a court suppressing speech must 
be aware that it is trenching on a zone made sacred by the First Amendment.181 
Judge Noonan concluded by reiterating that given the string of factual errors 
committed by the district judge, it was a mistake for the appellate court to accord 
deference to the lower court.182 “The mistake is magnified by the district court's and this 
court's remarkable error of law in failing to weigh the public interest in a biography of 
Elvis.  For these reasons, the grant of the preliminary injunction was a miscarriage of 
justice.” 
Three months later, Judge Noonan filed an amended dissent, incorporating 
additional comments:183 
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Indifference to the public interest at stake incorporates a profound 
misunderstanding of the purpose of the constitutional empowerment of Congress 
to protect copyright.  As the Supreme Court . . . patiently explains:  “The 
monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor 
primarily designed  to provide a special private benefit.  Rather, the limited grant 
is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved.184 
. . . To neglect the public interest in the protection afforded a copyright is 
to forget the purpose of copyright law.  The Constitution permits the creation of 
temporary monopolies in a context ruled by our American suspicion of 
monopolies and our high valuation of freedom of expression.   
 
Whatever one’s opinion of Elvis Presley’s music, it is difficult to dispute his 
tremendous impact on mid-twentieth century American culture.  As Judge Noonan rightly 
pointed out, the court’s failure to consider the First Amendment implications of fair use 
deprived the public of a significant work about an American icon. 
 F. Post-Presley 
Given the current intellectual property climate, Elvis Presley Enterprises may be a 
harbinger of things to come.  With so much money at stake, it should come as no surprise 
that the legal community is unabashedly assisting copyright holders in stifling First 
Amendment values.   
As one sign of this, Plaintiff’s counsel in the Presley case has held up its victory 
like a trophy, devoting an entire internet webpage to it.  Headlined SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR “THE KING,”185 the webpage states: 
 . . . The firm convinced the court that regardless of the “documentary” 
nature of Passport’s production, the amount of material appropriated from 
plaintiffs was far more than a minimal, illustrative use, and that Passport should 
have paid to license the clips from plaintiffs.186 The ruling is a big victory for 
copyright owners on issues of fair use in a documentary setting, especially 
given the increasing popularity of documentaries with box office audiences, 
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as evidenced by last year’s successes such as Fahrenheit 9/11 and Super Size 
Me.187 [Emphasis added.] 
 
In other words, filmmakers with the temerity to seek to create new films about 
American culture can expect to be threatened with Presley Enterprises-like lawsuits for 
the foreseeable future. 
 
XII. Conclusion:  A fair use standard for documentaries 
Current copyright policy rides roughshod over the First Amendment principles 
and goals conceived of by our Founders, and developed by the U.S. Supreme Court 
during the twentieth century.  The situation’s overall impact on our culture in general, 
and on documentary filmmaking in particular, extends far beyond the small niche market 
that documentaries comprise:  In point of fact, it actually harms our democratic system of 
governance. 
As with most social problems, it all boils down to economics.  Independent 
documentary filmmakers are neither organized nor wealthy, and even the educational 
community’s outcry over the limitations imposed by the current system is unlikely to 
change the status quo any time soon. 
However, the filmmaking and educational communities have not given up.  A 
consortium of interested groups188 recently released a Documentary Filmmakers’ 
Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use.189 Its purpose is to clarify the fair use doctrine 
so as to provide some guidance to filmmakers.  The statement works from the principle 
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that documentary filmmakers should have the same kid of access to copyrighted materials 
enjoyed by cultural and historical critics who work in print media, and by news 
broadcasters.190 
The statement sets out four classes of situations that documentary makers 
confront regularly, which ought to be the grounds for exercise of fair use:  
• When employing copyrighted material as the object of social, political, or cultural 
critique;191 
• When quoting copyrighted works of popular culture to illustrate an argument or 
point;192 
• Capturing copyrighted media content in the process of filming something else;193 
and 
 
• Using copyrighted material in a historical sequence.194 
The hope is that trial courts will also make use of the document in deciding future 
cases.  Only time will tell. 
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